1. Ανάρτηση από Patricia Marins (@pati_marins64)
Patricia Marins (@pati_marins64) δημοσίευσε στο 9:42 μ.μ. on Δευ, Ιουλ 21, 2025:
Amputations Revealing Over 1 Million Dead
In the face of a data blackout regarding war casualties, there is a tragic indicator capable of providing real estimates: the number of amputees.
On the Russian side, based on data from the Ministry of Labor, between February 2022 and July 2025, it is estimated that 249,213 to 350,787 prostheses were needed for war amputees in Ukraine, with 166,300 to 187,087 distributed and 82,913 to 163,700 not provided due to waiting lists (6 months to 1.5 years) and limitations in the Russian healthcare system.
The estimated number of amputees ranges from 180,000 to 220,000, of whom 110,867 to 124,725 received prostheses, while 55,275 to 109,133 remain without care.
On the Ukrainian side, the tragedy appears to be far greater. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, the number of Ukrainians with disabilities increased by 300,000 in just the first 18 months of the war. However, this figure does not account solely for limb loss, which, according to recent Ukrainian government estimates, is at least 300,000.
But how can these numbers translate into casualties on both sides?
In two more recent conflicts, the average number of amputees was around 10% of total casualties:
Korean War (1950–1953, USA):
Amputees: 2,300 to 5,000.
Killed in Action (KIA): 33,746.
Ratio: 7–15% (average of 11%, or 0.11 amputees per KIA).
Vietnam War (1955–1975, USA):
Amputees: 4,500 to 6,500.
Killed in Action (KIA): 58,220.
Ratio: 8–11% (average of 9.5%, or 0.095 amputees per KIA).
However, this ratio cannot be applied to a conflict like Ukraine’s, where artillery, missiles, and FABs cause 85–90% of casualties, resulting in severe trauma, compounded by slow evacuations, minefields, and conditions vastly different from Vietnam and Korea. What took 1–2 hours by helicopter in those conflicts takes many hours by land under intense fire in Ukraine, increasing secondary amputations. Additionally, around 1,200 field hospitals have been destroyed during the conflict.
The Russian Ministry recently stated that 54% of its combat wounded were amputees.
Part of this is due to the quality of medical kits, with Ukrainian kits (TCCC) being superior to Russian ones pre-2024.
However, since 2024, Russian kits (APPI) have approached Western standards, while Ukraine stopped receiving significant quantities of TCCC kits by mid-2023.
While medical kits help, in a conflict where Ukrainian forces absorbed 91% of the artillery fire between 2022 and 2024, injuries are likely severe, limiting the kits’ effectiveness. Statistically, in conflicts, 70% of amputations are caused by artillery. The lethality of the Ukraine conflict has already surpassed the combined casualty figures of the Vietnam and Korean Wars.
Korean War (1950–1953, USA):
Amputees: 2,300–5,000
Wounded: 260,000–280,000
Dead: 33,000–34,000
Wounded-to-Dead Ratio: 7:1–8:1
Amputee-to-Dead Ratio: 7–15% (0.07–0.15)
Total Casualties: 290,000–310,000
Artillery: 30–50%
Factors: Rapid helicopter evacuations, fewer explosives, no drones, moderate artillery, and minimal missile use.
Vietnam War (1955–1975, USA):
Amputees: 4,500–6,500
Wounded: 340,000–360,000
Dead: 57,000–59,000
Wounded-to-Dead Ratio: 5:1–6:1
Amputee-to-Dead Ratio: 8–11% (0.08–0.11)
Total Casualties: 400,000–420,000
Artillery: 30–50%
Factors: Similar to Korea.
Russia-Ukraine War (2022–2025, Ukraine):
Amputees: 300,000
Wounded: 420,000–440,000
Dead: 350,000–370,000
Wounded-to-Dead Ratio: 1:1.1–1:1.3
Amputee-to-Dead Ratio: 80–86% (0.8–0.86)
Total Casualties: 770,000–810,000
Artillery: 75–85%
Factors: 91% Russian artillery fire (10:1), dominant artillery, FABs, missiles, slow evacuations in minefields, Western medicine (TCCC) mitigates deaths.
Russia-Ukraine War (2022–2025, Russia):
Amputees: 180,000–220,000
Wounded: 330,000–410,000
Dead: 220,000–270,000
Wounded-to-Dead Ratio: 1.5:1
Amputee-to-Dead Ratio: 67–82% (0.67–0.82)
Total Casualties: 550,000–680,000
Artillery: 55–65%
Factors: Artillery, Ukrainian drones, greater exposure as invaders, poor medical kits (especially Wagner/separatists), amputation rate of 50–55%.
Why would Russian casualties be lower than Ukrainian ones, despite being the invading force and requiring greater effort?
Because Russians avoided frontal assaults without first saturating the area with artillery, often resulting in the complete destruction of structures.
This tactic, criticized in various wars, reduced Russian losses to 220,000–270,000 dead.
For Ukraine, the critical factor was the artillery fire over the two and a half years of war, leading to my estimate of 350,000–370,000 dead.
This number alone does not account for the shortage of Ukrainian troops on the front. It must be combined with another figure: deserters and missing in action (MIA).
On both sides, the number of missing ranges from 65,000 to 80,000. However, when it comes to desertions, they have significantly undermined the Ukrainian army.
The 230,804 criminal cases for desertion recorded by June 2025 likely underestimate the real number due to judicial delays and underreporting. In 2024, only 328 of the 90,843 registered cases reached the courts, indicating that official figures mainly reflect cases from 2022 and 2023, with many from 2024 and 2025 still unprocessed. This undoubtedly places the number of desertions in the Ukrainian army above 350,000, with around 20% returning under an amnesty program.
With my estimate of total casualties at 770,000–810,000, plus 70,000 MIA and 300,000 desertions, totaling 1,140,000–1,180,000 men, this has completely eroded Ukrainian manpower, which I estimate mobilized 1.5–1.7 million men.
The Russians, with more long-range weapons, can spare their troops, although they suffered significant losses in the early months of combat, where they often opted for frontal assaults.
As I estimated Russian casualties at 550,000–680,000, plus 70,000 MIA and 50,000 desertions, totaling around 670,000–800,000 men, demographics favor them despite the high losses.
Considering wartime bureaucracy and the Soviet-style approach to information, I believe the numbers for both sides could be higher.
However, given the weight of artillery saturation, FABs, and missiles as major causes of casualties, this inevitably affects Ukrainian troops far more. It also impacts desertion, as the psychological toll on men in defensive positions is immense, increasing desertions.
https://t.co/ZUsDD3ETOw
(https://x.com/pati_marins64/status/1947366571023749466?t=3zwhQMVLFj8EVC_m2vPmog&s=03)
